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against

defendant Carl F. Schettler.
2.

(R. 002)

In this action plaintiff alleged fraud,

misrepresentation, and breach of contract in connection with the
defendant's submission of a fraudulent claim for a stolen vehicle
under his policy with plaintiff.

(See Amended Complaint, R.

028-048)
3.

In response to plaintiff's claim, defendant brought a

counterclaim based on theories of defamation, insurer bad faith,
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, conversion, negligence
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

(See Amended

Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint, R. 051-058)
4.

In addition to his counterclaim defendant brought a

third-party action against third-party defendants National
Automobile Theft Bureau ("NATB") and an independent adjusting
company, Black, Nichols & Guiver.
5.

(R. 051-058)

The counterclaim and third-party action brought by

defendant sought damages in excess of $700,000,000.
6.

(R. 051-058)

After prolonged litigation including extensive

discovery, the trial court eventually dismissed defendant's
counterclaim and third-party complaint on October 31, 1986. Said
order and judgment of dismissal was certified a final judgment
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(R.

722-725)
7.

Defendant appealed from this final order and that

matter is the subject of a prior and separate appeal still pending
before the Utah Supreme Court, bearing Case No. 860621.
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interrogatories which were unanswered, personal and business
financial records, flooring agreements, correspondence, business
reports, copies of tape recordings, personal and business net
worth statements, balance sheets, and other documents as set forth
in plaintiff's requests.
15.

(See R. 816-830)

Defendant filed no memoranda or affidavits in

opposition to the motion for sanctions or to justify his failure
to comply with the court's order of December 31, 1986.

(See

Record)
16.

The trial court found defendant to be in violation of

its order compelling discovery and that defendant had offered no
justifiable excuse for its failure to respond to the discovery in
violation of the court's order compelling such discovery.

The

court ordered defendant's answer to be stricken and his default
entered as a sanction pursuant to Rule 37(b).

(See Order of

February 21, 1987; R. 878-79)

17.

After entry of defendant's default he filed a demand

for jury trial on March 3, 1987.
18.

(R. 887)

Plaintiff objected to the demand for jury trial and

the court, after oral argument via telephone conference with
counsel for plaintiff and defendant, ruled that defendant's demand
for jury trial was denied and that pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the remaining issue of damages
would be determined by submission of affidavits by both parties.
(See Order of March 10, 1987; R. 1143-4)
19.

Plaintiff submitted its memorandum and supporting
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to its own motion, poured over the present appeal to the Court of
Appeals of the State of Utah for disposition.
25.

No stipulation, motion or order regarding

consolidation of the instant appeal with either of the two other
pending appeals filed by defendant in this matter exist.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In response to defendant's claims of errors committed by
the trial court in its entry of the several orders and judgment
from which he presently appeals, plaintiff submits that each such
ruling by the trial court was proper and supported by the evidence
before the trial court.
First, the denial by the trial court of defendant's
motion for summary judgment was the only correct ruling the trial
court could make given the existence of genuine issues of fact
precluding summary judgment in favor of defendant.
The decision of the trial court in striking defendant's
answer and in entering his default as a sanction pursuant to Rule
37 U.R.C.P. was within the sound discretion of the trial court and
in this matter no abuse was present given the clear language of
the court's order compelling such discovery and defendant's
refusal to comply with the court's order and his history of discovery abuses in this matter.
Once defendant's default was entered he was in no
position to demand a jury trial on the issue of plaintiff's
damages.

The eventual ruling by the trial court in awarding

general damages of $98,579.24 and punitive damages of $100,000 is

r

amply supported by the extensive affidavits and supporting
evidence submitted by plaintiff and the lack of meaningful
opposition to such evidence submitted by defendant.

The trial

court's judgment in assessing the amount <j>f damages to be awarded
plaintiff was in accord with decisions of the Utah Supreme Court
regarding punitive damages in the light off all the facts
surrounding defendant's conduct giving ri^e to plaintiff's claims
and during the conduct of the litigation,
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FJACT EXISTED
PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT,
The first point raised as "error" in this appeal is the
trial court's denial of defendant's motion! for summary judgment.
On November 4, 1986, defendant moved for summary judgment to
dismiss plaintiff's complaint which included claims for fraud,
misrepresentation and breach of contract.
On this issue the standard to be applied has long been
held to be that where a genuine issue of fact exists, considering
all the evidence most favorably to the party opposing summary
judgment, summary judgment must be denied

Bihlmaier v. Carson,

603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979); Sandberg v. KleinL, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah
1978); and Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah (2d 292, 431 P.2d 126
(1967).

As specifically stated by the Utah Supreme Court in

Bihlmaier, supra, the trial court is under a duty to view all
evidence, admissions and inferences most favorably to the party

opposing summary judgment.

See 603 P.2d at 791-2.

While defendant does not challenge the above standard as
applicable to his motion for summary judgment he attempts to
mislead this court by limiting its review to questions of "loss"
or "theft".

Even attempting to so restrict this court's review

defendant misstates the law with regard to what constitutes an
insured "loss" under an automobile policy insuring against a loss
by "theft".
Plaintiff will herein show that genuine issues of fact
indeed existed precluding summary judgment and contrary to
defendant's claim, a technical theft does not constitute an
insured loss under his auto policy with plaintiff.
First, it is beyond dispute that the existence of a
genuine issue of fact in support of any of the causes of action
asserted by plaintiff is sufficient to defeat his motion for
summary judgment.

In the present case the record is replete with

evidence in support of plaintiff's claims that defendant committed
fraud, misrepresentation or breached express and implied terms of
his insurance policy contract when he submitted his claim for a
"stolen" vehicle.

The evidence established that the vehicle had

actually been repossessed by the repair shop for unpaid services
and work.

Such evidence precluding summary judgment included:
1.

Testimony by the manager of the auto repair shop, Mr.

Wayne Schoenfeld of Pioneer Dodge that subsequent to repossession
and before submission of the "theft" claim by defendant, he
received a call from defendant during which he advised defendant

that he was in possession of defendant's (par.

(Depo. of Wayne

Schoenfeld, pp. 39-40, R. 1174)
2.

The investigating officer fr6m the Salt Lake County

Sheriff's Department investigating the stolen vehicle report made
by defendant specifically questioned defendant as to whether the
vehicle could have been repossessed.
defendant responded "no chance".

The officer testified that

(Criminal Trial Transcript, Day

1, pp. 7-9)
3.

Additionally, although defendant continually denied

he ever telephoned Pioneer Dodge to ask if they had repossessed
his car, defendant's friend, M. K. Fadel, testified that defendant
told him he had made such a phone call to Pioneer Dodge.
(Depo. of M. K. Fadel, p. 25, R. 1175)
4.

It is furthermore undisputed in this matter that more

than a month and a half transpired between the date defendant's
vehicle was repossessed by Pioneer Dodge and his receipt of
payment on his "stolen" vehicle claim from plaintiff.

(Affidavit

of Ron Rosenthal, R. 351-7)
The above-recited facts, sufficiently demonstrate that
the trial court properly denied defendant's motion for summary
judgment because evidence was in the record supporting plaintiff's
claims.
Defendant, by dwelling on the claim that Pioneer Dodge
had not perfected its lien interest in his automobile and
therefore committed a technical theft when it repossessed,
attempts to cloud and confuse the issues th$t were before the

trial court and which bear on this appeal.

Whether or not Pioneer

Dodge had perfected its lien is immaterial to the claims of fraud,
misrepresentation and breach of contract asserted by plaintiff. A
jury could reasonably find that defendant withheld material
information when he knowingly failed to advise his insurer that
his vehicle was in possession, whether lawfully or not, of Pioneer
Dodge.

The withholding of such pertinent information could indeed

be found by a reasonable jury to have constituted "fraud or
misrepresentation" by defendant.

It is in fact undisputed in this

matter that Pioneer Dodge acted in pursuit of a good faith claim
for unpaid repair bills.
As such, the case authorities consistently hold that
although a technical "theft" may have occurred, this does not
constitute a "loss" under one's automobile theft coverage of his
insurance policy.
The Utah Supreme Court has not directly decided this
issue.

However, in P. E. Ashton Co. v. Joyner, 17 Utah 2d 162,

406 P.2d 306 (1965), the Utah Supreme Court plainly indicates that
more than a technical theft is required to constitute a loss under
an insurance policy.

Defendant's use of this case in his brief in

support of the proposition that "the meaning of theft within an
insurance policy should be liberally construed" cannot be
supported by the decision in Joyner.

The Utah court expressly

requires the absence of good faith justification or a claim of
right to the property before such will constitute "theft" under an
insurance policy.

As the court stated:

In view of the foregoing policy, it seems
more logical and equitable j:hat this court
interpret the term "theft", as used in the
instant policy of insurance!| as including
the wilful taking or appropriation of one's
personal property by another, wrongfully and
without justification, with the design to
hold or make use of such property in
violation of the rights of the owner. Id.
at 308.
I
In a case factually indistinguishable from the present
appeal the Seventh Circuit in Young-Peterson Construction, Inc. v.
Potomac Insurance Co., 382 F.2d 400 (7th C ir. 1967) , held that
although there was a technical theft of an insured vehicle, due to
a claimed, although erroneous, right to th

vehicle by another,

there was not a "loss by theft" under the insurance policy
afforded by defendant.
In Young-Peterson Construction, the plaintiff's former
president, Allen Young, signed title to four company tractors and
trailers as security for loans made by Mr. Robert Holtman.

At th

time of conveyance of title Mr. Young's employment with plaintiff
had expired.

Upon default on the loans by plaintiff, Holtman

sought to take possession of the vehicles

Plaintiff, through its

attorney, advised Holtman that the conveyance of title by Mr.
Young was void due to his prior termination as president of the
company.

Holtman nonetheless took possession and transported the

vehicles out of state for sale.

Plaintiff then submitted the

theft claim under its policy with Potomac Insurance.
issue the Seventh Circuit Court held:

On this

Consequently, we are not here concerned with
what actual and legal rights or obligations
were created between plaintiff and Holtman
by the transactions involved [likewise this
court is not concerned with the rights and
obligations between Pioneer Dodge and
defendant Carl SchettlerJ.
We are, however, of the opinion that
there is evidence from which the jury could
have reasonably concluded that Holtman's
taking of the truck tractors and trailers
was in a good faith exercise of a claim of
right . . . The taking was therefore not
within the "loss by theft" coverage afforded
by the policy issued by the defendant. Id.
at 403. (emphasis added)
Similarly, in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Switzer,
257 Ark. 810, 520 S.W.2d 245 (1975), the Arkansas Supreme Court
overruled the trial court's finding of an insured loss under an
automobile theft coverage policy where the insured knew, or had
reason to know, of the location of the vehicle and that the person
in possession asserted a claim to the vehicle.

Additional

authorities holding in accord with these decisions include:

South

Carolina Insurance Co. v. Jackson, 103 Ga.App. 3, 117 S.W.2d 878
(1961); Bigus v. Pacific Coast Casualty Co., 145 Mo.App. 170, 129
S.W. 982 (1910); Rush v. Boston Insurance Co., 88 Misc. 48, 150
N.Y.S. 457 (1914); Bowling v. Hamblen County Motor Co., 167
Tenn.App. 52, 66 S.W.2d 229 (1932).
As the court in Young-Peterson Construction, Inc. v.
Potomac Insurance Co., supra, noted, "We are not here concerned
with what actual and legal rights or obligations were created"
between Pioneer Dodge and defendant.

What is important is that

there was evidence in the record which supported plaintiff's

theories that defendant knew or had reason to know of the
whereabouts of his car at the time he submitted his "stolen"
vehicle report to plaintiff.

As such whether or not there have

been a technical "theft" is immaterial.

Since defendant's failure

to inform his insurer of the known whereabouts of the car
constituted a withholding of material information.

Since such

evidence was replete in the record, the trial court correctly
denied defendant's motion for summary judgment which would have
dismissed plaintiff's complaint on all thepries
POINT II.
NO ERROR EXISTED IN STRIKING DEFENDANT'S
ANSWER AND ENTERING HIS DEFAULT.
The second alleged error by defendant relates to the
decision by the trial court to impose sanctions pursuant to Rule
37(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Defendant hopes to restrict the court's review of the
facts that lead the trial court to impose sanctions.

He argues

that the only basis for the sanction was hi s failure to produce
personal tax returns.

However, the scope q f defendant's disregard

for discovery rules and violation of express court orders
compelling discovery is much broader.

The trial court's order of

December 31, 1986 stated:
Furthermore, with a denial ofl defendant's
motion for summary judgment pfllaintiff's
motion to compel production or documents is
granted, defendant having twolweeks from the
date hereof to fully and completely respond
to plaintiff's request for documents dated

March 18 and March 27 of 1986.
added) (R. 803-4)

(emphasis

It is undisputed that nothing further was done by
defendant subsequent to the court's order in attempt to comply
therewith.

No further documents were provided, no further answers

to interrogatories were given and no affidavits were filed
explaining the reasons, if any, why discovery could not be
provided.

In effect, there was a total disregard of the court's

order.
As a result of defendant's blatant disregard for the
trial court's order, sanctions were deemed appropriate pursuant to
Rule 37(b).
sanctions.

This conduct alone would have warranted the court's
However, at that point in the proceedings the trial

court had before it a history of repeated discovery abuses and
conduct of the most outrageous nature by defendant and his
counsel.
This conduct by defendant and his counsel were the
subject of an earlier motion for sanctions which was heard in
connection with plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in August,
1986.

(See R. 340-341 and as more particularly detailed in the

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike, R. 360-382)

Particular

instances of misconduct during litigation included:
1.

A threat by defendant Carl Schettler against

witnesses Ruel Ware and Dorothy Ware during their depositions of
February 13, 1986.

(See Affidavit of Court Reporter, Lynne L.

Schinderling, R. 462-5)

2.

Mr. Wayne Schoenfeld, former manager of Pioneer

Dodge, Inc., testified that three or four weeks before his
deposition he was approached by defendant s attorney, Mr. Edward
Flint, who misrepresented himself as counsel for an insurance
company.

(See Deposition of Wayne Schoenfeld, pp. 102-3, R. 1174)
Before the scheduled deposit: ons of Mr. and Mrs,

3.

Steven Smith in Tampa, Florida, defendant1 s counsel spoke by
phone with Mr. and Mrs. Smith and told th^m that if they consented
to give their deposition in Florida, he would subpoena them and
they would be compelled to come to Utah to appear at the trial.
As a result of these intimidating misrepresentations as to
subpoena power, the Smiths initially declined to give their
depositions.

(See Depositions of Jill Smith, pp. 29-33, R. 1148;

see also Deposition of Steve Smith, p. 33- B5; R. 1149)
4.

Finally, and most egregious, there was testimony from

an independent witness, Mr. Troy Murdock, Iphat in April, 1986,
shortly before he was to give a deposition in this matter, he was
picked up by defendant and his attorney and two other large
gentlemen, taken to a notary and coerced into signing a false
affidavit.

The witness also testified that} he was offered $1,000

by defendant in exchange for not appearing for his deposition.
(See Transcript of Hearing before Judge Dean Conder on April 14,
1986, R. 1677-1701; and Deposition of Troy Murdock, R. 1161)
As a result of this conduct by defendant and his counsel,
plaintiff brought its earlier motion to str ike pleadings as an
appropriate sanction which was still under consideration by the

trial court at the time of its ruling on plaintiff1s second motion
for sanctions in February, 1987.

(R. 722-5)

Hence, the trial

court had before it serious and repeated attempts by defendant and
his counsel to impede justice, suppress evidence and fabricate
false testimony through improper influence of witnesses.

Given

this entire history which defendant carefully avoids in his brief,
it is understandable and commendable that the trial court would
impose the most severe sanctions authorized by Rule 37(b).
In W. W. & W. B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West village,
Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1974), the Utah Supreme Court held that
default as a sanction is appropriate where the failure to respond
to discovery impedes the trial or frustrates the purposes of
justice and the determination of the validity of a defendant's
claims:
The sanction of default is justified where
there has been a frustration of the judicial
process, viz, where the failure to respond
to discovery impedes trial on the merits and
makes them possible to ascertain whether the
allegations of the answer have any factual
merit, Id. at 738.
In the present case defendant's misconduct is far more
serious than that of the defendant in w. W. & W. B. Gardner.

Even

disregarding defendant's attempt to coerce, intimidate and bribe
witnesses he was in direct violation of the court's express order
of December 31, 1986.

In W. W. & W. B. Gardner, the defendant was

not in violation of such an order yet the Supreme Court approved
default as a sanction.

Clearly the attempts by defendant to

frustrate the civil trial process were severe.

The record will

also reflect the trial was approximately one month away at the
time of the hearing on the motion for sanctions.

(R. 801)

Fortunately, the courts of this state have seldom to deal
with the type of litigation misconduct as involved in the present
action.

However, in a prior case also involving litigation

misconduct by a defendant, the Utah Supreme Court in Synergetics
v. Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., 701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985), note
the importance of parties to a lawsuit complying with the trial
court's orders regarding discovery:
Were this court to allow such flagrant
disregard for properly constituted orders of
the lower courts, any defendant could avoid
his obligations simply by becoming
incommunicado. Id. at 1112.
Although the court in Synergetics was dealing with the
defendant's repeated absence from the jurisdiction to avoid his
deposition, the principle it announced applies equally in the
present case.

In Synergetics, as in the present case, the trial

court imposed the sanction of defaulting tljie defendant in
violation of express court orders.
Finally, certain statements of factt and law contained in
defendant's brief must be addressed.

In attempting to overturn

the lower court's ruling imposing sanctions , defendant misstates
both the law and the facts applicable to th is action. First,
defendant cites W. W. & W. B. Gardner, suprlla, for the proposition
that willful disobedience to a court order |is a prerequisite to
sanctions.

However, this is a misstatement of the direct holding

in that case.

As stated at page 7 38 of the decision: "Under Rule

37(b) sanctions are justified without reference to whether the
unexcused failure to make the discovery was willful."

(emphasis

added)
Second, defendant makes a blatant misstatement of the
facts in claiming he had given full access to his financial
records and other requested documents prior to the hearing on the
motion for sanctions.

This simply is untrue.

Defendant cannot

support this claim by reference to the record because the record
will reveal that no such access had been given.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
JURY DEMAND SUBSEQUENT TO ENTRY OF HIS
DEFAULT.
The third alleged error was the ruling by the trial court
that defendant was not entitled to a jury trial in determining the
amount of damages to be awarded plaintiff subsequent to striking
defendant's answer and entering his default.
The trial court clearly ruled pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in making this decision in
its order of March 10, 1987.

(R. 1143-4)

That rule states:

(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be
entered as follows:
. . .

(2) By the Court. In all other cases
the party entitled to a judgment by default
shall apply to the court therefore. If, in
order to enable the court to enter judgment
or to carry it into effect, it is necessary
to take an account or to determine the

amount of damages or to establish the truth
of any averment by evidence or to make an
investigation of any other matter, the court
may conduct such hearings or order such
references as it deems necessary and proper.
Defendant's argument that despite the entry of his default he is
entitled to a jury trial on the issue of damages is simply without
merit.

The procedure employed by the court in the present case

was also adopted by the trial court in Synergetics v. Marathon
Ranching Co., Ltd., supra.

There the Utatj Supreme Court expressly

approved the procedure of determining the (amount of damages following default by submission of appropriate affidavits by both
parties.

As the court summarily held:
Defendants finally argue thalt the district
court erred in assessing damages against
defendants without a hearing. This
contention is without merit. Id. at 1112.
(emphasis added)
In the present case defendant availed himself of the

opportunity provided by the trial court and filed his own
memorandum and affidavit.

He did not object to the affidavits

filed by plaintiff nor move to strike.

(R| 1196-8)

Permitting defendant to submit counteraffidavits on the
question of damages was the most the trial court was obligated to
do.

Indeed, once a party is in default, whether pursuant to

sanctions under Rule 37 or otherwise, the courts recognize a party
lacks standing and is incompetent to compel] further proceedings
before the court.

Such is the purpose of tlhe entry of a default

to eliminate one's personam standi in judic io.

This was

recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in a d ivorce action, Heath

v. Heath, 541 P.2d 1040 (1975):
Defendant also contends that the trial
court, in order to get around a 90-day
period, it must have ordered a hearing and
given the defendant notice thereof. This
may have been so if defendant timely had
filed an answer, but not where he was in
default, in which event he is not entitled
to either a hearing or notice. Id. at 1041.
(emphasis added)
Also, in Zweifel v. State Ex Rel. Brimmer, 517 P.2d 493
(Wyo. 1974), the Wyoming court in dealing with the entry of
defendant's default as a sanction cited with approval the
following language from 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure, §2688, p. 282:
Once the default is established defendant
has no further standing to contest the
factual allegations of plaintiff's claim for
relief. Id. at 499.
Accordingly, under the prevailing rule among
jurisdictions and specifically approved by the Utah Supreme Court
in Synergetics, defendant in this matter had no further standing
to demand a jury and the submission of the issue of damages to the
court upon the filing of affidavits was proper.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF GENERAL DAMAGES
WAS PROPER AND SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Defendant next claims error by alleging that the trial
court's award of general damages was unsupported by the evidence
and the trial court failed to make necessary findings in its award
of $98,579.24 as general damages.
groundless.

This contention is also

After striking defendant's answelr and entering his
default, the trial court permitted both parties to submit
affidavits on the issue of damages.

After due consideration c

over 200 pages of memos, receipts, statements and other
documentations in support of general damages, the trial court
issued its memorandum decision in part finding:
The court has carefully considered the file,
the memorandum in support off damages award,
and memorandum in opposition thereto, and is
of the opinion that both general and
punitive damages should be awarded in this
matter. Damages are therefore awarded in
favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant in the sum of $98, 579.24 as actual
damages to compensate the pilaintiff for the
sums actually lost due to de1If end ant ' s
conduct, . . . (R. 1210)
Subsequent to this memorandum dec ision the trial court
made the following findings in its Finding^ of Fact and Judgment
of May 6, 1987.

(R. 1223-1225):

The court further finds that general damages
are reasonable and proper in favor of
plaintiff and against defendant in the
amount of $98,579.24 to compensate plaintiff
for sums actually lost due to defendant's
fraud and other misconduct.
As stated above, these express findings by the court with
regard to general damages were amply supported by extensive
affidavits and supporting documents includirng receipts, billings
and other out-of-pocket expenses incurred by defendant as detailed
in the affidavits of Henry E. Heath, Attorney, Robert Wallace,
Attorney, and Ronald G. Rosenthal.

Defendant's contention that

the award of general damages is unsupported is simply without

i

merit.
Furthermore, where a case supports an award of punitive
damages, courts of Utah and other states have long recognized that
a separate award of attorney's fees is also appropriate.

This was

tacitly acknowledged by the Utah Supreme Court in Dahl v. Prince,
230 P.2d 328 (Utah 1951), where the Utah Supreme Court stated that
attorney's fees could be awarded where there was statutory
provision, contract authorizing counsel fees or an award of
punitive damages.

(See Dahl v. Prince, supra, at p. 329)

This principle was again announced by the Utah Supreme
Court in DeBry & Hilton Travel v. Capital International Airways,
583 P.2d 1181 (1978).

The court there held:

Counsel fees, in matters such as the one at
hand [breach of contract action] can be
considered as an element of damages only in
those cases in which exemplary damages are
or can be awarded. Idk at 1185.
As in DeBry, the present action included a breach of
contract theory in addition to fraud and misrepresentation.

In

both its memorandum decision and its findings of fact the trial
court expressly found that punitive damages were both appropriate
and necessary.

(See R. 1222-5)

Therefore, under the standards

set forth, counsel fees were appropriately awarded.
The trial court's award of attorneys' fees as an element
of general damages is further supported by pertinent Utah
statutory law.

Defendant was originally charged and tried for

criminal insurance fraud.

Utah Code Annot. §76-6-521 (1953)

provides that any person who presents a fraudulent insurance claim

is punishable "as in the manner prescribe' for theft of property
of like value."

Theft of property valued in excess of $1,000 is

punishable as a second degree felony.
§76-6-412(1)(a)(i) (1953).

Ut ih Code Annot.

The insurance claim submitted by

defendant was well in excess of $6,000.
law any person who

in addition, under Utah

has been the victim of a theft by the

presentment of a fraudulent insurance claim, "may bring an action
. . . for three times the amount of actual damages . . . costs of
suit and reasonable attorneys' fees.

Utah Code Annot.

§76-6-412(2) (1953) (emphasis added). Bas||ed upon the foregoing
statutory scheme, it is clear that the tri al court did not err in
awarding attorneys' fees as an element of general damages in the
instant case.
Finally, it has long been recognifeed that where a claim
for fraud is established, attorneys' fees may be awarded.

See

Wedig v. Brinster, 1 Conn.App. 123, 46 9 A.^d 783 (1983); Schlein
v. Smith, 160 F.2d 22 (App.D.C. 1947).
POINT V.
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED BY THE] TRIAL COURT IN
AWARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES OF $100,000.
The final alleged error by defendant was the trial
court's award of $100,000 as punitive damages.

Again, defendant

blindly asserts that this determination was unsupported by the
record and that the court did not make the necessary findings
Defendant also claims that the award was excessive in light of the
"actual damages"

Taking these allegations seriatum, it will be shown that
(a) the court made express findings of fact on the issue of
punitive damages, (b) the court's findings were supported by
evidence in the record and (c) the award was proper in light of
the facts and circumstances and standards set forth by decisions
of the Utah Supreme Court.
A.

The Court Entered Findings of Fact With Regard to
Punitive Damages.

In the court's memorandum decision of April 23, 1987, the
trial court specifically found as follows:
The court has carefully considered the file,
the memorandum in support of damages award,
and the memorandum in opposition thereto,
and is of the opinion that both general and
punitive damages should be awarded in this
matter. Damages are therefore awarded in
favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant in the sum of . . ., and the
separate award of $100,000 as punitive
damages as based upon the actions of the
defendant herein.
The court does not lightly award the
damages set forth above, but has stated
carefully, and at length considered the
voluminous file and all of the various turns
and twists that this case has taken. The
court is of the opinion that the defendant
committed fraud as alleged in plaintiff's
complaint, and thereafter in the defense of
the instant action engaged in activities
both individually and through counsel which
are reprehensible, inexcusable and which
warrant both general damages and punitive
damages as a clear warning to others that
such behavior will not be tolerated by
society. The court would not feel as
strongly about this matter as it does were
it not convinced that the actions have been
of a very dangerous nature, with complete

disregard for the rights ofl others, and
designed in its ultimate end purpose to
influence improperly the decision of this
court.
(See R. 1210-1211)
Subsequently, the court entered |ts Findings of Fact and
Judgment of May 6, 1987 finding in part:
Defendant, Carl F. Schettler, committed
fraud as alleged in plaintiff's complaint
and such facts as otherwise pled in
plaintiff's complaint are e^ tablished by
reason of the court's prior order striking
defendant's answer and enter!ing his default,
2. The court further finds that
subsequent to plaintiff initj:iating this
action defendant in defense bf this case
engaged in activities both ikndividually and
through counsel which the court finds are
reprehensible, inexcusable and of sufficient
gravity to warrant both general and punitive
damages as a warning to defendant and others
that such behavior would not be tolerated
by society.
5. The court further finds that
punitive damages are reasonable and proper
given the conduct of defendant in the amount
of $100,000.
Obviously, the claim that the court failed to make
appropriate findings simply cannot stand.
B.

The Court's Findings With Red ard to Punitive Damages
Were Supported by the Evidenqe.

In addition to the facts in the record as discussed under
Point II, supra, regarding litigation and misconduct by defendant
and his attorney, the court also had before it an established
claim of fraud and misrepresentation againsj: defendant.

This by

virtue of the entry of defendant's default.) Thus, all allegations

as contained in plaintiff's complaint were deemed established.
Additionally, the record included documentation of
defendant's net worth in the form of personal financial statements
that showed an average net worth for the years 1981 through 1986
of $1,399,080.

(R. 958-981)

Defendant's most recent personal financial statement
dated May 22, 1986 revealed personal net worth of $1,493,400.
Defendant in his deposition admitted that his net worth had
changed little from that time.

(See R. 958-60 and Deposition of

Carl Schettler of February 27, 1987, pp. 18-31, R. 983-996)
Punitive damages high enough to constitute a strong
warning to defendant and others were also warranted by defendant's
threats of retribution against plaintiff.

In his deposition

defendant admitted to making such statements to Mr.

Ronald

Rosenthal, E*ranch Manager for Arnica Mutual Insurance.

Defendant

stated:
Q. At any time during that conversation did
you make the statement to Mr. Rosenthal that
you would seek some type of retribution
against Arnica and that you would some day
own Arnica Insurance -A.

Not at that time, no.

Q.

When did you make such a statement?

A. A statement similar to that was made to
Mr. Rosenthal at the time of the preliminary
hearing, I believe.
Q.

Do you recall what words you used?

A.

No.

Q. Were they substantially! similar to the
words that some day you wou|ld own Arnica
Insurance?
A- Not exactly that, but that they would
suffer the consequences of their error.
That was made clear to them.
Q.

How would they suffer the consequences?

A. Monetarily.
That's the only way they
can suffer the consequences
(Deposition of
Carl F. Schettler, pp. 103-104)
The above facts as well as those set forth under Point
II, above, constitute only a portion of the record before the
trial court in its determination of puniti ve damages.

A party's

misconduct of pre-trial litigation and the| trial court's
difficulties in dealing with such a party lis another factor
recognized as influencing the amount of exemplary damages

As

held in Synergetics, supra:
Thus, this Court must look at the award
[punitive damages], keeping in mind the
attempted frustration of the judicial
process by defendants which Resulted in the
default judgment in the first place. Id. at
1113. (emphasis added)
This is the same situation presented in the instant
appeal.

The court in Synergetics, although dealing with much less

serious misconduct, held:
Given the circumstances of thle case, the
award appears eminently reasonable,
Therefore, the district court did not abuse
its discretion in awarding punitive damages
in the amount of $200,000. Id. at 1113.
The entirety of the record demonstrated by the above sampling of
facts shows the trial court did not abuse its discretion in fixing

punitive damages at $100,000.
C.

The Award of Punitive Damages is Not Excessive in
Light of the Entirety of the Record and Given
Guidelines Pronounced by the Utah Supreme Court.

Defendant does not argue that punitive damages were
inappropriate but merely attacks the amount fixed by the trial
court.

The Utah Supreme Court in First Security Bank of Utah v.

J.B.J. Feedyards, 653 P.2d 591 (1982), discussed the factors to be
considered in fixing the amount of punitive damages:
In determining the amount of such damages,
the factfinder should consider the following
factors: The nature of the alleged
misconduct of the defendant, the extent of
the effect of the misconduct on the lives of
the plaintiff and others, the probability of
future reoccurrence of such conduct, the
relationship between the parties, the
relative wealth of the defendant, the facts
and circumstances surrounding the misconduct
and the amount of actual damages awarded.
653 P.2d 598-9. (emphasis added)
Defendant, in his brief, mentions only the amount of
alleged "actual damages" in arguing that the punitive damages were
excessive.

However, assuming arguendo defendant's claimed amount

of actual damages is correct, it is only one of the factors
identified in First Security Bank v. J.B.J. Feedyards that bears
on the amount of punitive damages to be awarded.

In the instant

appeal, the following factors must also be considered:
1.

By virtue of his default, the allegations of fraud

and misrepresentation in plaintiff's complaint were deemed
confessed.

Hence, it was established that defendant had knowingly

and fraudulently submitted his claim under his policy and

plaintiff relied on his false representations to its detriment.
2.

During litigation of this matter defendant personally

and through counsel attempted to threaten

intimidate and coerce

witnesses (see Record citations under Point II above)
3-

Defendant personally threatened plaintiff's Branch

Manager in retaliation for cooperation with law enforcement
officers investigating criminal charges against defendant.
4.

The filing of a counterclaim |by defendant against

plaintiff alleging seven causes of action |and seeking damages in
excess of $700,000,000.
5.

Deliberate disregard by defendant of court orders

expressly compelling discovery
Given these factors and others, it cannot be said that
the trial court clearly abused its discretion in awarding punitive
damages of $100,000.

Rather, given the outrageous nature of

defendant's conduct as established by the confessed pleadings and
his conduct of the litigation, the amount oJf punitive damages
awarded is a proper punishment to defendant: and others who would
engage in similar conduct.

As stated by the trial court judge:

The court does not lightly award the damages
set forth above, but has stated carefully,
and at length considered the voluminous file
and all the various turns and twists that
this case has taken. The court is of the
opinion that the defendant committed fraud
as alleged in plaintiff's complaint, and
thereafter in the defense of the instant
action engaged in activities both
individually and through counsel which are
reprehensible, inexcusable and which warrant

both general damages and punitive damages as
a clear warning to others that such behavior
will not be tolerated by society* The court
would not feel as strongly about this matter
as it does if it were not convinced that the
actions have been of a very dangerous
nature, with complete disregard for the
rights of others, and designed in his ultimate
end purpose to influence improperly the
decision of this court, (R. 1211)
The above language from the court's memorandum decision reflects
its involvement and perception of the multitude of factors which
led up to its award of punitive damages.

The trial court was best

positioned to make such a determination.

Although punitive

damages are to be sparingly awarded, the trial court was
convinced, as reflected by the above language, that such damages
were absolutely necessary given defendant's conduct.

This court

should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on
this matter.

The award fixed by the trial court should stand for

the reasons the trial court itself pronounced.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has herein shown that the claimed errors by
defendant in the court's various rulings are without merit.
In considering defendant's motion for summary judgment
the trial court properly refused to dismiss plaintiff's complaint
as there were genuine issues of fact in the record which supported
plaintiff's claims for relief.

Defendant's argument that there

could be no claim of fraud or misrepresentations since there had
in fact been a "theft" of his automobile fails because defendant's
flagrant withholding of information from plaintiff and law

enforcement officers investigating his stolen vehicle report
constituted a withholding of material information as to the car's
location and precluded a thorough investigation by plaintiff.
Defendant's claim that the trial|court erred in imposing
the sanction of entry of his default for failure to produce
discovery fails because it has been shown that the trial court
acted within its sound discretion as permitted by Rule 37(b)
especially where it had previously ordered production of the
discovery which order went unheeded by defendant.

This violation

of a court order was but one instance in aj pattern of discovery
abuse, intimidation and litigation misconduct by defendant and his
counsel.
Once defendant's default had beenl entered by the court,
he was in no position to demand a jury trial on the issue of
damages.

Accordingly, the trial court's denial of a jury trial on

the issue of damages was not error but purs uant to procedures
expressly approved in Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching, Ltd.,
supra.
Finally, with regard to the amount of general and
punitive damages determined by the trial court, defendant has
failed to show how error was committed.

On the contrary, it has

been shown herein that the awards were made pursuant to express
findings amply supported by evidence submit]ted in the form of
affidavits and otherwise.

Defendant's argument that punitive

damages in particular were excessive given the amount of "actual
damages" is erroneous because it falsely assumes the amount of

actual damages and furthermore fails to consider the other factors
present before the court which it was also obligated to take into
account in its determination.
For these reasons plaintiff respectfully prays that this
Honorable Court affirm the various rulings by the trial court.
Respectfully submitted this 7 ~

day of December, 1987.
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